IED Clearance Good Practice Guide

The GICHD has developed an IED Clearance Good Practice Guide with the aim of sharing information across the mine action sector to assist in safe, effective and efficient IED search and disposal activities as part of a broader IED clearance process. The guide provides technical content related to specific techniques and procedures but is not intended to replace training or technical publications supplied by equipment providers. This guide is intended to be used to inform the development of National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) and organisational level Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), including staff training and policy related to IEDs.

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE CLEARANCE GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE 2020 EDITION

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is a neutral, independent and well trusted centre of expertise and knowledge.

The GICHD works towards reducing risk to communities caused by explosive ordnance, with a focus on landmines, cluster munitions and ammunition stockpiles.

We help national authorities, international and regional organisations, NGOs and commercial operators to develop and professionalise mine action and ammunition management. The GICHD supports around 40 affected states and territories every year.

This guide was jointly prepared by GICHD Advisors Nicholas Bray, Robert Friedel and Ian Robb, and Artios Global Ltd.

GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING Improvised Explosive Device Clearance Good Practice Guide, GICHD, Geneva, 2020 © GICHD

ISBN: 978-2-940369-81-2

The content of this publication, its presentation and the designations employed do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the GICHD regarding the legal status of any country, territory or armed group, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. All content remains the sole responsibility of the GICHD.

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE CLEARANCE GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE 2020 EDITION

CONTENTS

Introduction

Scope

Guidance on using this publication

Chapter 1 Introduction to IEDs in mine action

1. General considerations for IED clearance

1.1. Technical overview of an IED

1.2. IED categorisation

2. IED threat assessment

2.1. Information sources

2.2.Operational threat assessment process triad

2.3.Operational threat assessment output

2.4.Operational threat assessment – scenario examples

3. Technical IED capabilities

3.1. Time IEDs

3.2. Command IEDs

3.3. Victim operated IEDs

3.4. Vehicle-borne IEDs

3.5. Projected or dropped IEDs

3.6. Scenario examples

4. Lexicon of acronyms

5. Glossary of terms

Chapter 2 Search

1. Introduction

1.1. Scope

1.2. General search principles

1.3. IED clearance parameters

1.4.Worksite safety

1.5.Management of non-explosive hazards

103

1.6.Mitigating additional hazards

110

2. Search planning and execution

111

2.1. Introduction

111

2.2. Stages of IED search

111

2.3. Support to IEDD spot tasks

131

Annexes C1-C4. Search planning and execution forms

132

3. Search core skills and procedures

168

3.1. Introduction

168

3.2. Core skill 1 – Visual search

172

3.3. Core skill 2 – Visual search using an aid

176

3.4. Core skill 3 – Use of detectors in IED search

186

3.5. Core skill 4 – Fingertip search

191

3.6. Core skill 5 – Marking

193

3.7. Core skill 6 – Excavation and confirmation

196

3.8. Core skill 7 – Semi-remote search (hook and line)

203

3.9. Core skill 8 – Dealing with vegetation

211

3.10. Core skill 9 – Handovers during manual search

214

4. Clearance reporting

217

4.1. Post clearance activities

217

4.2. Information management and reporting

220

5.Management of training

224

5.1. Recommended minimum competencies for IED search

224

5.2. Key considerations

225

5.3.Urban IED search training

226

5.4.Management of training

227

5.5. Training assessments

228

5.6. IED risk education

229

6. Lexicon of acronyms

231

Chapter 3 Improvised Explosive Device Disposal

235

1. IEDD in mine action – overview

237

1.1. Introduction

237

1.2. Scope

238

1.3.Mine action IEDD guiding philosophy

239

1.4. General principles

241

1.5.Mandatory actions

248

1.6.Working practices

250

1.7.Management oversight and referrals

260

2. IED tactics

263

2.1. Time IEDs

263

2.2. Command IEDs

269

2.3. Victim operated IEDs (VOIEDs)

276

2.4. IEDs targeting disposal procedures

286

2.5. Person borne suicide IEDs

289

2.6. Projected IEDs

291

2.7. Vehicle borne IEDs

295

3. IEDD task conduct

302

3.1. Task conduct and phases

302

3.2.Home-made explosives

329

4. IEDD techniques and procedures

335

4.1.MA IEDD equipment options

335

4.2. ROV actions including manipulator, disruptor and cutter

337

4.3.Hook and line

342

4.4. Barrel disruptors

353

4.5. Bottle disruptors

361

4.6. Shaped charges

375

4.7. Shaped charge effects

383

4.8.Demolition in situ

384

4.9. Pyrotechnic torch / thermite lance

389

4.10.Human remains clearance

393

4.11.Use of UAVs during humanitarian IEDD

396

4.12. Portable digital X-ray

399

4.13. Vehicle clearance

403

4.14. VBIED disruptors and extractors

408

4.15. Initiator and detonator safety

425

5. Lexicon of acronyms

430

Chapter 4 IED Indicators and Ground Sign Awareness Handbook

433

1. Scope

435

2.Using this handbook

436

3. IED indicators

438

3.1. The basics

438

3.2. CAGE (Channelling, Aiming markers, Ground sign, Environment)

442

3.3. The Big 5

450

4. IED signs

455

4.1. Categories of signs

455

4.2. Types of signs

467

4.3. Classification of signs

470

4.4. Factors that affect signs

472

4.5.Determining the age of a sign

477

4.6. Information gained from signs

479

4.7.Methods of interpretation of signs

480

5. Scenario examples

481

5.1. Scenario 1 – Iraq - Defensive IED belts

481

5.2. Scenario 2 – Afghanistan foot patrol route

485

5.3. Scenario 3 – Command IED

490

6. Conclusion

495

7. Lexicon of acronyms

496

8. Glossary of terms

497

INTRODUCTION

An improvised explosive device (IED) is “a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic materials or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores but are normally devised from non-military components.” 1

ׁ NOTE. When IEDs meet the definition of anti-personnel (AP) mines, this must be recorded and reported, as they are also subject to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).

Over the last decade a clear trend has been witnessed in the increased use of IEDs by armed groups. This increase has been simultaneous to a worldwide decline in the production, storage and use of commercially manufactured anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. These two factors working together have magnified the impact that IEDs as a category of explosive ordnance (EO) has on post-conflict settings. In many post-conflict environments, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, IEDs now cause more civilian casualties than commercially manufactured landmines. 2 Enduring post-conflict IED contamination creates an environment of sustained insecurity and hinders recovery. The use of IEDs against civilians affects the entire spectrum of their human rights, including the right to life, physical security, education and health. Moreover, the socio-economic impact on goals for sustainable development can be significant given that IEDs impede commerce, contribute to internal displacement and refugee flows, obstruct humanitarian responses and civil society activity, and the practice of good governance and reconstruction. Reducing the impact of IEDs involves close cooperation and coordination between the diplomatic, rule of law, economic and information levers of power to restrict or undermine their use, protect the population, enhance their security freedoms, and restore confidence. Mine action (MA) therefore plays a significant part in facilitating the recovery of communities experiencing IED contamination in the wake of conflict. The GICHD has developed this IED Clearance Good Practice Guide with the aim of sharing information across the MA sector to assist in safe, effective and efficient IED search and disposal activities as part of a broader MA IED clearance process. The guide provides technical content related to specific techniques and procedures but is not intended to replace training or technical publications supplied by equipment providers.

1 IMAS 04.10 February 2019. Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations. 2 In Afghanistan, mines of an improvised nature were responsible for more than 17 times the casualties as conventionally manufactured mines in 2019 (62 antipersonnel mines; 21 antivehicle mine; 1,093 improvised mines). http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2020/afghanistan/ casualties.aspx In Iraq during 2019, improvised mines cause almost 6 times the casualties of the conventionally manufactured mines, where a large number of mines are of unknown nature (of 242 casualties from mines in 2020, 28 were caused by antipersonnel mines; 161 by improvised mines; and 53 as a result of unspecified mines). http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2020/iraq/casualties.aspx

A single MA worksite contaminated with IEDs can encompass multiple different types of ‘space’; from buildings and other man-made structures, to open areas, roads and confined spaces. Secondary hazards (such as oil and gas pipelines, fuel stations, chemical containers, human waste and electricity lines) can also contaminate these spaces, making survey and clearance challenging tasks. IEDs can be laid in defined patterns, such as those associated with conventional minefields, or in a more focused manner to deny specific areas, protect supply routes, degrade clearance operations or instil fear within the local community. The technical ‘threat’ of IEDs may also vary from ‘simple’ to ‘complex’ within a relatively small geographical area (complexity depends on the capability of an armed group and the availability of material), or it can be relatively consistent over a much larger geographical area, such as improvised minefields designed to slow the advance of security forces during a conflict. This guide provides tools to mitigate risk and exploit opportunities in order to maximise efficiency during MA operations where IED clearance is being conducted. With such improvisation in design and complexity comes a requirement to employ techniques and procedures which provide confidence that “all reasonable effort” has been achieved and that the specified clearance parameters will and ultimately have been met. Although not a quality management (QM) guide, this publication provides a link to help explain “all reasonable effort” in relation to IED clearance. This guide is intended to be used to inform the development of National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) and organisational level Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), including staff training and policy related to IEDs. Critically, due to the ‘improvised’ nature of IEDs, the activities associated with a clearance process must also incorporate effective threat assessment to form part of a wider platform from which nationally led responses can be established. This is not just a threat assessment of the device itself, but also the potential threat surrounding the team task site. Nor is threat assessment bound to the tactical level – it must also be considered at the operational and national levels, such as determining the security environment in which MA operates, and if national support mechanisms are in place to sustain the activities. Based on information collected and analysed by MA organisations, the ‘threat assessment’ provides confidence in decision-making at all levels.

Image 1. Mine action operator using optics to enhance visual search

SCOPE The GICHD IED Clearance Good Practice Guide is a technical publication intended for use by MA staff that are suitably trained and qualified in IED search and / or disposal. The intention is to help ‘operationalise’ and ‘institutionalise’ IED clearance as part of the MA response. The guide complies with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), which provide the framework for response to all explosive ordnance contamination, under the conditions of humanitarian principles. It is intended for use by MA organisations, national authorities, operational implementers and training providers. It may be used by such staff as a source of reference in the delivery of training, but it is not intended as a training manual in itself. This guide complements the IMAS released in early 2019 for IED Disposal (IMAS 09.31), Building Clearance (IMAS 09.13) and Risk Management in Mine Action (IMAS 07.14). It acknowledges that post- conflict IED contamination occurs in urban, semi-urban and rural locations. It seeks to communicate sectorial good practice as part of an IED clearance process of interlinked activities including operational planning, survey, search and disposal in order to ‘clear’ IED contamination. It concentrates on providing good practice guidance on the latter two of these activities: IED search and IED disposal. ׁ DISCLAIMER. This publication makes reference to non-technical and technical survey and complements the associated IMAS for these activities. It DOES NOT contain technical guidance on the use of demining machines or animal detection systems as part of an IED clearance process, or provide explicit detail on MA ‘systems’ to release IED contaminated areas. The user should therefore refer to IMAS 07.11 Land Release and the complementary GICHD urban approach model.

ׁ WARNING. This guide is NOT intended for use outside of a humanitarian mine action context.

Image 2. Mine action IEDD operator checking both ends of a tripwire

GUIDANCE ON USING THIS PUBLICATION

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION TO IED s IN MINE ACTION

This chapter provides a general description of the following considerations: IED clearance in MA; high- level IED tactics; and the use of threat assessment to provide confidence in decision-making.

ׁ RECOMMENDATION. This section is intended to be read by all staff involved in the management of IED clearance operations.

CHAPTER 2 – IED SEARCH

This chapter provides guidance on IED search activities as part of an MA IED clearance process. It explains the principles described in IMAS 09.13 for Building Clearance, and provides detailed guidance on the following: search-related training, planning and information gathering; threat assessment; collective and individual techniques and procedures (including the use of tools and aids) to detect and locate IEDs in both urban and rural environments.

ׁ RECOMMENDATION. This section should be read by all staff involved in the management of search activities related to the clearance of IEDs.

CHAPTER 3 – IED DISPOSAL

This chapter provides guidance on IED disposal (IEDD) as an activity within an MA clearance process. It explains the following: IEDD principles, mandatory actions and conventions as described in IMAS 09.31 on IEDD; detailed IED tactics of armed groups; IEDD planning and task conduct; MA IEDD operator techniques and procedures that are internationally recognised as ‘good practice’.

ׁ RECOMMENDATION. This section should be read by all staff involved in the management of disposal activities related to the clearance of IED contamination.

CHAPTER 4 – IED INDICATORS AND GROUND SIGN AWARENESS HANDBOOK

This chapter provides guidance on the use of indicators and signs to assist in the identification of IEDs and other EO during survey and clearance. It should also inform explosive ordnance risk education practitioners in the development of methodologies, approaches and tools that are specific to environments contaminated with IEDs and other EO. Chapter 4 explains IED indicators, categories of signs, types of signs and methods for their interpretation. It includes 3 scenarios.

ׁ RECOMMENDATION. This section should be read by all staff involved in the management of disposal activities related to survey and the clearance of IED contamination, as well as by explosive ordnance risk education practitioners.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO IED s IN MINE ACTION

1.GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR IED CLEARANCE

Image 3. Location of a detonator lead by a mine action IEDD operator

IED search and disposal operations have traditionally been activities conducted by security forces during armed conflict. MA organisations must carefully consider the security envelope in which they operate at the cessation of hostilities, to maintain the humanitarian principle of neutrality. If the security environment is not understood, then MA staff could become the target of state / non-state armed groups. While it is recognised that MA organisations may be present in places where there is a risk of attack from a NSAG, the intended target has passed (surveillance is highly unlikely) and the IED becomes an obstacle to development and humanitarian goals. Only when there is a combination of an adequately secure environment (within which it is possible to operate in accordance with established humanitarian principles), and a type of IED for which the organisation has the necessary skills, equipment and procedures to render safe, is it appropriate to proceed. Decisions about when it is appropriate for MA organisations to engage with IEDs, and about what types of IED they are equipped and competent to address, relate to the MA operating envelope described above. This is wholly dependent upon threat assessment.

General considerations for IED clearance

MA IED clearance organisations should be acutely aware of the previous actions of other operators and agencies such as security forces, and how these may have been observed and targeted during the conflict. For example, if security forces were regularly conducting manual actions such as moving IED components by hand, or manually cutting explosive or electrical links, these patterns may have provided an opportunity for them to be targeted.

ׁ WARNING. If at any stage an MA organisation believes that it is being deliberately targeted, operations should immediately cease until it can be confirmed it is no longer under direct threat.

COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE

IEDs are frequently used in asymmetric conflicts involving various armed groups. These conflicts tend to be cyclic and enforcing international treaties can be problematic. Establishing and maintaining community consent is therefore critical to avoid breaches of neutrality. It may not be immediately evident whether an armed group still maintains an active interest in IEDs that were placed during the conflict, especially when fighting continues in neighbouring areas. The community is likely to be the best source of indicators on the presence of suitable conditions.

ׁ WARNING. If these conditions are not achieved, then the risk of an MA organisation being deliberately targeted increases and this guide cannot be effectively or safely applied.

MA organisations operating in an IED-affected, asymmetric conflict space, should consider developing and implementing community liaison plans that identify potential changes in the humanitarian space. These should cut across functional areas from strategic to tactical, and involve programme, operational, risk education and survey staff.

1.1. TECHNICAL OVERVIEW OF AN IED

There are five component parts common to most modern IEDs:

• Main charge . This contains the explosives (low or high) intended to function and deliver a specific effect. The explosives may be home made, military or commercial. High explosives will detonate whether confined or unconfined, whereas low explosives will burn when unconfined and produce a higher-pressure event if suitably confined. Armed groups will often try to configure a main charge to a desired effect, which falls into two categories: a directional blast effect or an omnidirectional blast effect. A directional blast effect is used specifically to focus the power of the explosive and/or fragmentation in a particular direction, whilst an omnidirectional blast effect is used when a radial effect is desirable. • Initiator . This is the component designed to initiate the main charge. High explosives require a detonator, whereas low explosives can be initiated by a heat source such as the bridge wire from a light bulb. The initiator can be home made, commercially or military manufactured or it can be converted; for example, a plain detonator can be converted to an electrical one. • Firing switch . This component passes energy (power) to the initiator to complete initiation. This could be kinetic energy from a cocked striker, heat from a burning fuse or electrical energy from a battery. • Power source . This stores the energy (power) that is released through the method of initiation and then transferred to the initiator. Frequently, this will be a battery (electrical) but could be chemical (heat) in a safety fuse, or potential energy (kinetic) in a compressed spring. • Container . The means by which all or some of the other IED components are encased. It may include the object that holds the main charge or the packaging that surrounds the battery. It may camouflage the device and / or generate fragmentation including directional effects.

General considerations for IED clearance

Some IEDs may also include enhancements such as a safe-to-arm switch that increases safety for the person that emplaces the device. Safe-to-arm switches include timers (mechanical and electronic), twisted electrical leads, command wire and radio control receivers. Safe-to-arm switches should be considered during the planning of render safe procedures (RSPs). ׁ REMEMBER. Like all explosive ordnance, an IED contains an explosive train, which is a succession of initiating and igniting elements arranged in such a way as to cause a charge to function. The normal configuration is: initiator > booster charge (if required) > main charge. A thorough understanding of the explosive train used in an IED can inform an effective RSP, thereby minimising risk to the MA IEDD operator. 1.2. IED CATEGORISATION There are three main categories of IED associated with MA IED clearance: time, command and victim operated (VO). There are an additional three categories that are worth noting, for reporting purposes: combination / multi switch, hoax and false. Details are as follows: • Time . This is an IED designed to function at a predetermined moment in time. It could be a short delay for an improvised hand-thrown grenade or long delay targeting a high-profile event. • Command . This is an IED that remains under the control of an armed actor and is activated by them completing a specific action. Often, this means that the device can be activated ‘at the optimum moment’. It may be physically linked (e.g. command wire, command pull) or non- physically linked (e.g. a radio-controlled device). • Victim operated . This is an IED that functions through an action made by the victim, normally either through contact (e.g. a pressure plate or tripwire) or influence (e.g. passive infrared (PIR) sensor). Victim operated IEDs (VOIED) can cause a significant number of unintended casualties as they can remain viable for a long period of time after the conflict has ended. This category of device is the one most likely to be encountered in significant numbers during MA operations. It should be noted that a VOIED may also fall under the definition of an AP mine. • Combination / multi switch . This type of IED incorporates multiple types of firing switches (e.g. a victim operated IED armed by a radio control that enables specific targeting and mitigates against jamming). A single IED can also have multiple switches of the same type (e.g. two or more different pressure plates or multiple crush wires). • Hoax . These are designed to resemble a viable IED in order to achieve a desired effect. Normally they are physical (i.e. an actual object) but can also be non physical and simply rely on fear (e.g. a coded warning for a prominent event). MA organisations may encounter physical hoax devices during survey and clearance operations. • False . Not all suspect items turn out to be viable devices. Searchers / deminers will regularly identify wires and other objects that resemble components of IEDs but turn out to be innocuous after more detailed investigation by an MA IEDD operator.

General considerations for IED clearance

2. IED THREAT ASSESSMENT

Image 4. A mine action IEDD operator using a window to observe the inside of a building

This section aims to assist MA organisations in the development of national threat analysis and operational threat assessment in accordance with Annex C of IMAS 07.14 Risk Management in Mine Action.

Both national threat analysis and operational threat assessment provide MA organisations with processes to systematically and consistently analyse IED threats. The intention is that this consistency adds confidence to decision-making associated with the IED threat. In IMAS, threat and risk are closely related, with threat being a risk that includes malicious human intent that will influence its nature and severity. This is a distinction made in multiple sectors that are involved in areas such as cyber and physical security.

ׁ REMEMBER. These processes are part of broader MA risk management systems that also include non-explosive risks.

IED threat assessment

WHAT IS NATIONAL THREAT ANALYSIS?

National threat analysis considers the macro situation with respect to how IED contamination affects MA programming. MA organisations operating in states that suffer from cyclic conflict, often involving non- state armed groups, can also use national threat analysis to make an assessment of the security situation. The GICHD’s Guide to Mine Action outlines five phases in MA programming:

1. Conflict 2. Immediate post-conflict stabilisation

3. Priority reconstruction 4. Assisted development 5. Development

National threat analysis will be of particular use in phases 2 and 3, during which there is an increased risk of recurrence of violence, as well as a rapid expansion of operational areas, as conditions evolve to facilitate MA.

ׁ WARNING. This guide does not provide detailed guidance on national threat analysis.

WHAT IS OPERATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT?

Operational threat assessment is focused at the task site and on the individual activity (detection, location, disposal, etc). At the task site level it adds confidence to the decision-making processes related to IMAS 07.11 Land Release and at the activity level to functions such as IMAS 09.31 IEDD and IMAS 09.13 Building Clearance.

WHAT DO NATIONAL THREAT ANALYSIS AND OPERATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT ENABLE?

Neither are intended to have a defined end point, and this means that as new information is obtained it should be inputted to enable continual refinement. Both enable better informed decision-making to improve the safety, effectiveness and efficiency of MA operations. A national threat analysis is conducted at the strategic level and helps ensure that an MA response is staffed with people with appropriate competencies, and that equipment and procedures are developed, tested and employed to conduct the required activities to achieve the outputs that are needed. Ultimately, this will enable the outcomes that are most needed and valued by the community. At the task level, an operational threat assessment enables the selection of a suitably qualified survey team prior to survey and the accurate classification, categorisation and identification of boundaries of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) containing IED contamination and to release them safely and efficiently. For example, it will enable the reduction and cancellation of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) by providing a consistent method for the analysis of new information from both new key informants and through technical survey activities. It will also enable the most efficient clearance processes and procedures to release CHAs. This means that the appropriate level of effort can be applied to achieve the same minimum level of confidence no matter how an IED-contaminated hazardous area is released. The result will be that valuable resources are not wasted carrying out expensive clearance, if suitable evidence exists to demonstrate with confidence that IED contamination is not present. At the individual level, an operational threat assessment will ensure that search is conducted in a manner that is as safe as possible. For example, the operational threat assessment process can be used to make informed decisions on the probable locations of main charges or electrical links, and to enable the

IED threat assessment

avoidance of firing switch locations when there is a VOIED threat. For an MA IEDD operator it also means that they can plan and execute the safest possible RSP by understanding the most likely, best-case and worst-case scenarios prior to leaving the contact point.

2.1. INFORMATION SOURCES Information sources provide the primary input to operational threat assessment and national threat analysis. They can be gathered intrusively (via technical survey and / or clearance activities) or non- intrusively (via non-technical survey).

NON-INTRUSIVE

Image 5. Observing hazard area marking during non-technical survey (NTS) is an example of evidence gathered by non-intrusive means

• Key informants. Members of affected communities, including ex-combatants, that can be interviewed to provide information. • Monitoring of movements of internally displaced persons. This can be achieved through tools such as the Displacement Tracking Matrix. • Social media. This can be particularly useful at the national threat analysis level when an MA response is being established or broadened in scope. • Casualty data. This can come from government departments and NGOs. • Previous NTS, TS and clearance reports. Held by the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and other agencies, as well as by the MA organisation conducting an operational threat assessment. • Satellite images. Accurate satellite imagery is critically important at the macro level to compare pre- and post-conflict battle damage, critical infrastructure and likely defensive locations, and at the task-specific level for planning clearance. • Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) imagery. This can be taken from outside a defined SHA / CHA to provide 360 degree and current imagery of the site. There is potential that other sensors, not just cameras, can be fitted.

IED threat assessment

INTRUSIVE

Image 6. Building clearance is an intrusive information source

Where intrusive operations have been conducted, reports should include technical information on IEDs that have been removed or destroyed. This should be reported in a consistent manner to enable inter- organisational analysis to establish trends and ensure that procedures remain appropriate.

TECHNICAL INFORMATION

Technical information should be recorded in detail for IED components. An example below:

Image 7. A tripwire IED, the components of which are described in Table 1

IED threat assessment

A bare wire loop switch contained in a clear 500 ml (200 mm x 95 mm) drinking bottle and consisting of two electrical wires, one red and one brown. A length of fishing line was attached to the red wire which had been laid across the adjacent track.

SWITCH(ES)

The main charge consisted of a black metal (probable steel) cylinder with an outside diameter of approximately 300 mm and 350 mm in length. The wall thickness was approximately 5 mm. A section of flat steel of the same thickness was welded on to one end with approximately 100 mm of red detonating cord protruding through a centrally located hole. At the other end there was a fragmentation matrix consisting of a mixture of nuts and bolts. The main charge contained approximately 10 kg of probable ammonium nitrate-based home-made explosive (HME).

MAIN CHARGE

1 x black and silver PP3 9V battery with “ENERGY” stencilling, wrapped in black adhesive tape with a length of white electrical wire secured to each terminal. The battery was secured to the outside of the bare wire switch using clear adhesive tape.

POWER SOURCE

The initiator was a commercial detonator measuring approximately 55 mm in length and 9 mm in diameter. Two yellow electrical leads protruded from a yellow plastic bung at the base of the detonator, each measuring approximately 400 mm in length. “DANGER BLASTING CAP” was stencilled in black on the detonator’s body.

INITIATOR

The IED components had not been placed in a container but camouflaged in long grass.

CONTAINER

Table 1. Example of IED reporting details for a tripwire IED

It will not always be possible or necessary to record this level of descriptive free text detail for every single IED. This volume of information could make effective information management difficult and laborious.

ׁ HINT. In the case of technical reports of new, novel or significant IEDs, however, this level of detail may need to be exceeded.

A better method may be predetermined fields, ideally specified by the NMAA, or at least with a broad consensus between MA implementers that are conducting IED survey and clearance.

Annex B of IMAS 05.10 on Information Management for Mine Action provides minimum data requirements for EO, but due to the improvised nature and novel ways in which IEDs can be employed, there is a requirement for more detailed reporting. An example of how set fields could be used to report the minimum requirements for the descriptive example above are in Table 2.

ׁ NOTE. When IEDs meet the definition of AP mines, this must be recorded and reported, as they are also subject to the APMBC.

IED threat assessment

Table 2. Minimum IED component reporting requirements

IED threat assessment

2.2.OPERATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS TRIAD

Tripwire

Main charge, switch, initiator and battery

Image 8. How do MA staff make the decision on whether to tripwire ‘feel’ or not?

The threat triad interlinks three factors:

INTENT

CAPABILITY

Most likely threat

OPPORTUNITY

Figure 1. Threat triad, IMAS 07.14 Annex C

The primary output of the threat triad tool is a threat summary that describes the nature of the assessed IED contamination.

IED threat assessment

2.2.1. INTENT Intent is the effect that an armed actor ‘wanted’ to achieve. The past tense is used here to reflect the importance in MA of considering the intent at the time the IED was placed, dropped or thrown. The intent of different armed groups will vary between strategic, operational and tactical. At the strategic level, an armed group will establish an overall goal or purpose that drives their involvement in armed conflict. This will in turn drive (or not), the use of IEDs. If an armed group intends to use IEDs as a weapons system, then it does not mean they will use every option that is available. For example, some armed groups would not use suicide IEDs as this may not correspond to cultural or religious values. Some armed groups also have significantly less tolerance for inflicting civilian casualties than others. If this is the case, then the use of VOIEDs and / or landmines of an improvised nature will be subject to controls. Some armed groups will be indifferent or only take on board minor considerations related to civilian casualties, viewing them as a necessary part of the conflict. Other groups will deliberately target civilians. This may be specific ethnic groups or simply to create fear and instability. The value that armed groups place on their own personnel and communities will be reflected in their intent and therefore how they use IEDs. For example, safe-to-arm switches (such as timers) may be incorporated in VOIEDs to provide a delay in the circuit becoming ‘active’ and therefore increasing the safety of the person making the emplacement. Such switches allow time to retreat to a safe distance from the IED after it has been laid. Some armed groups will even use time IEDs to target infrastructure and issue a warning so that civilians can be moved out of harm’s way.

Examples of an armed group’s differing intents include:

INTENT

SO WHAT?

An armed group wants to target road convoys yet maintain the popular support of the local population and leave the route open to other traffic.

Command-initiated devices may better match the intent than VOIEDs as they avoid unintentional casualties.

VOIEDs or improvised landmines may match the intent better than command IEDs as the armed group does not need to constantly observe every IED day and night.

An armed group wants to persistently deny ground to an opponent.

An armed group wants to stop personnel being captured alive and wants any personnel that is facing capture to have the ability to conduct a final act to inflict casualties.

Person-borne suicide IEDs may be commonly carried and not reserved only for spectacular attacks.

Table 3. Analysis of ‘Intent’

2.2.2.CAPABILITY Capability considers what IEDs an armed group will use, and will not use, to achieve its intent. Efficient use of resources is a critical factor for sustaining any armed campaign. The best ‘quality’ IED is the one that can achieve the required result with least amount of resources consumed. This means a ‘good IED capability’ does not have to be the most technically advanced, as a $5 VOIED may be much ‘better’ from the perspective of an armed group than a $100 radio-controlled IED (RCIED).

IED threat assessment

Consideration of capability will enable the following question to be answered:

How would an armed group have tried to best achieve their desired effect within the constraints they faced?

Not all groups have access to all IED-related technology and material. Some materials are more scarce or costly than others and will be used sparingly, whereas others may be cheap and suitable for large-scale use.

AVAILABILITY OF MATERIAL

The number of available personnel involved in a conflict will often relate to the scale of IED contamination that is left behind. This is not just the personnel that directly use IEDs but also those available in their manufacture and transportation through logistical chains.

PERSONNEL

Some IEDs require greater levels of knowledge and skill to deploy effectively than others. Some also require certain fundamental attitudes such as in the placement of VOIEDs inside civilian residences or the use of suicide IEDs.

TRAINING

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND SUPPORT FROM THE LOCAL POPULATION

The emplacement of large numbers of IEDs, such as defensive belts consisting of hundreds of VOIEDs to deny freedom of movement, require access to large manufacturing facilities and associated real estate and logistical systems.

Table 4. Capability assessments

The assessment of capability, matched against the intent and opportunity, will enable the following to be assessed:

Where are the high-risk parts of an SHA / CHA? Will different types of IEDs be located in different places or will there be concentrations of multiple IEDs of the same type in a certain location?

LOCATION

Time, command or VO. These can also be broken down into subcategories such as with VO: high metal content or low metal content.

FIRING SWITCH

Different main charges provide different advantages and disadvantages. For example, an off-route main charge targeting vehicles may be more likely to be an explosively formed projectile (EFP) or ‘platter’ charge. Whereas if a blast main charge was used it would likely need to be much larger and located directly underneath the vehicle. People who have dismounted from a vehicle are more likely to be targeted by small blast or fragmentation, with the latter providing an advantage that multiple people can be targeted by a single IED. How can components be placed to best effect? For example, an opposing armed group uses metal detectors. Using a low metal content pressure plate, a plastic main charge container, and a power source several metres away from the anticipated direction of approach, will make the IED harder to detect.

MAIN CHARGE

COMPONENT LAYOUT

Some armed groups have more overall capacity to build and sustain the use of IEDs for longer than others. This will affect the overall scale but not all categories of IED will be used as frequently.

OVERALL SCALE AND FREQUENCY

Table 5. Analysis of capability in consideration of intent and opportunity

IED threat assessment

2.2.3.OPPORTUNITY Opportunity relates to an armed group identifying the vulnerabilities of an opponent and exploiting them. Armed groups often use IEDs to exploit weakness through observing patterns that have been set, assessing tactics and procedures, and analysing likely avenues of approach or vital ground (either symbolically, politically or tactically). Assessment of opportunity can consider specific targeting. For example, a military convoy transiting a busy road being targeted by a command device at a specific point. It can also be used to assess wider- level operational plans, such as an armed group’s defence of a city using IEDs to deny ‘avenues of approach’ created by open areas or multiple routes that afford an opposing group the ability to attack en masse. Opportunity factors provide useful information on where a device will be located and how and what the armed actor will have emplaced. The following three factors are important to consider when analysing opportunity:

What opportunities does the terrain provide? At the higher level this is an analysis of the make-up of urban, rural and interface areas, including water features and transportation networks. Further terrain analysis can then be conducted at the MA task site level to determine the high-risk parts of an SHA / CHA. For example, locations of choke points, slowdown and channelled areas. This can be split between two time frames: Conflict . Did the community remain in the area during the conflict or leave? Post conflict . Is the community providing direct or indirect evidence of IED contamination? At the strategic level this will be how an armed group fought their campaign against their opponent(s). At the operational level these are the specifics of how they operated. For example, did they use armoured vehicles, in what formations and how were these being deployed? At the tactical level this will aim to identify what the specific targetable actions were at the time of conflict. For example, poor procedures used by clearance teams or recurring actions such as assaulting forces always entering through obvious points.

TERRAIN

LOCAL COMMUNITY

OPPONENT’S DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

Table 6. Analysis of opportunity-based factors

Opportunity factors can directly affect the make-up of an IED. For example, from an armed actor’s perspective:

EXAMPLE OF OBSERVATION

OPPORTUNITY

If metal detectors were extensively used by an opponent.

Then an armed actor may have used low metal content IEDs.

If poor disposal procedures were employed by an opponent.

Then these may have been observed to deliberately target personnel conducting disposal.

Then an armed actor may have used an EFP main charge to try to penetrate the armour.

If an opponent used heavily armoured vehicles.

Then a directional fragmentation main charge might have caused the most casualties.

If the target was a dismounted patrol.

Table 7. How opportunity can affect the construction of an IED

IED threat assessment

2.3.OPERATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OUTPUT

Operational threat assessment enables the following six Ws to be answered:

WHO?

Who placed, dropped or threw the IED(s)?

WHO?

Who was the target?

WHAT?

What are the components and layout of the IED?

WHEN?

When was the IED(s) placed, dropped or thrown?

WHERE?

Where is the IED(s) located?

WHY?

Why is the IED there? What was it intended to achieve or target?

THREAT SUMMARY

A primary means of communicating the output of the operational threat assessment is a threat summary, which can be fed into the planning process at a variety of levels. This means that whether decisions are being made at the strategic-, operational- or task-specific levels there will be consistency in the approach used in the analysis of the available information.

The information used in the threat assessment process should be recorded in an accessible and auditable way so that all stakeholders can have confidence in the threat summary. In general threat summaries can:

• Produce general assessments for programme-level planning;

• Make recommendations about the classification, categorisation and definition of SHAs / CHAs;

• Support priority setting at various levels;

• Inform decisions related to the release of hazardous areas.

IED threat assessment

2.4.OPERATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT – SCENARIO EXAMPLES

The following three examples explain the operational threat assessment process. Each scenario is fictitious and referred to in the present tense.

2.4.1. SCENARIO 1 – OPERATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT

Suspected IED

Image 9. Suspected IED under road bridge (important infrastructure)

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

An MA operator receives a request to conduct NTS of a road bridge. The bridge is the primary crossing point over a 20 m-wide, fast-flowing river. It links two sides of a large city that was the scene of intense fighting between two armed groups, one of which made extensive use of IEDs.

DESKTOP INFORMATION

The following information is gathered through the desktop assessment:

• The last fighting in the area occurred 60 days prior to the tasking request being received.

• Critical infrastructure is known to have been targeted by time-initiated IEDs.

• The only command IEDs to be used were physically linked, i.e. command wire or command pull. No RCIEDs were reported.

• Civilian vehicles and people have been reported to be crossing the bridge in large numbers.

• The police checkpoint adjacent to the bridge has reported a suspect object under one of the bridge abutments.

IED threat assessment

NTS INFORMATION

The following information is gathered during NTS of the bridge:

• A police officer is questioned as a key informant. He reports a large blue drum on its side with cord protruding from it. • A UAV is used to observe the bridge in detail and a blue drum is confirmed. It appears to have blue detonating cord protruding from it and what appears to be a black safety (burning) fuze. • The police officer is questioned further and reports that a similar object was cleared by the army unit on the other side of the bridge approximately 40 days previously. The army unit has now left the area and cannot be contacted. • A woman working as a local shopkeeper reports that she believes at least one explosion has occurred in the vicinity of the bridge in the last 60 days. A child that went down to swim under the bridge lost a leg. • The police inform the NTS team that no one is currently allowed adjacent to, or under, the bridge.

The UAV is used to build a detailed picture of the terrain around the bridge. Each side of the bridge represents a channelled approach and a seat of an explosion can be observed on the left-hand side.

HME demolition charge

Igniferous time fuze

Image 10. Image taken by the UAV during NTS

OPERATIONAL THREAT SUMMARY

It is assessed that an igniferous time IED containing approximately 100 kg of HME is located directly under the bridge. It is probable that either the fuze was not ignited or a misfire occurred. It is assessed that the IED was not placed after the conflict in the area finished. The explosion that occurred is assessed to have probably been the result of a VOIED containing 1–2 kg of HME in a plastic container. This had probably been placed to protect the primary time IED. It is possible that further VOIEDs may be present.

WHO?

A non-state armed group (NSAG) placed, dropped or threw the IED(s).

WHO?

State armed groups were the target.

WHAT?

Large igniferous time-initiated blast IED, with secondary VOIEDs and small main charges.

WHEN?

The IEDs were placed at least six months previously.

WHERE?

Directly under the bridge abutment with the VOIEDs protecting potential approach routes.

The time IED is there to destroy the bridge, which was seen as critical infrastructure during the conflict. The VOIEDs are there to protect the time IED.

WHY?

IED threat assessment

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