Threat Assessment & Summary
Title: Officers’ Quarters Neighbourhood Threat Assessment
Organisation Ref: GS 107 TA (2)
4. Evidence (Only evidence in which there is suitable confidence to be used for analysis) 4a. Threat intent
Consider who are the armed group(s) and their direct/indirect target(s). What were / are the armed group’s desired effects, objectives and results? Consider the time frame since the threat(s) developed
Information source (interview, observation, photo, open source data, assumption, comparison, etc.)
Attachment Ref. Assessment
1. Open source (various)
It’s widely known that this non-state armed group occupied this area for some time and then withdrew north after prolonged fighting with state armed groups, 12 months ago (Feb 2018). Their intention in this area was to defend from infantry assault generally from the south and east and locally 360 ° , leaving no warning signs, with a disregard for the safety of returning civilians.
N/A
2. Conversation with mayor’s staff, Feb 2019
N/A
3. GS 107 NTS Report
A1
4. Conversation with locals Feb 2019 Attachment 3 (sketch map)
A3
4b. Threat capability
Consider what resources and freedom of movement was available to the armed group(s). What was the armed group’s ability and how were/are they influenced and motivated? List capabilities that may be in the armed group(s) ability and score out if not specifically applicable after analysis
Capability analysis
• Large improvised mortar + projectile (120 mm+) • Smaller improvised mortar + projectile • Command devices • VO devices • Crush wire switch • High metal content pressure plate • Trip wire • Directional frag main charge • Plastic jug main charge • Chemical weapons • Anti-lift switches Information source (interview, observation, photo, open source data, assumption, comparison, etc.)
Attachment Ref. Assessment
1.
GS 107 NTS Report
A1
During recent clearance operations in this area the almost exclusive main charge construction is the ‘20 kg’ plastic jug, and consequently the clearance conducted by the military EOD on this site reveals the same. The same unit has recovered abandoned anti-lift switches of the ‘fridge light’ variety and other components. There are photographs in the GS 107 NTS Report of local stockpiles of plastic jug main charges, 9V power sources, a mixture of civilian and improvised detonators and low metal content switches.
2
Search planning and execution
147
Powered by FlippingBook