avoidance of firing switch locations when there is a VOIED threat. For an MA IEDD operator it also means that they can plan and execute the safest possible RSP by understanding the most likely, best-case and worst-case scenarios prior to leaving the contact point.
2.1. INFORMATION SOURCES Information sources provide the primary input to operational threat assessment and national threat analysis. They can be gathered intrusively (via technical survey and / or clearance activities) or non- intrusively (via non-technical survey).
NON-INTRUSIVE
Image 5. Observing hazard area marking during non-technical survey (NTS) is an example of evidence gathered by non-intrusive means
• Key informants. Members of affected communities, including ex-combatants, that can be interviewed to provide information. • Monitoring of movements of internally displaced persons. This can be achieved through tools such as the Displacement Tracking Matrix. • Social media. This can be particularly useful at the national threat analysis level when an MA response is being established or broadened in scope. • Casualty data. This can come from government departments and NGOs. • Previous NTS, TS and clearance reports. Held by the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and other agencies, as well as by the MA organisation conducting an operational threat assessment. • Satellite images. Accurate satellite imagery is critically important at the macro level to compare pre- and post-conflict battle damage, critical infrastructure and likely defensive locations, and at the task-specific level for planning clearance. • Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) imagery. This can be taken from outside a defined SHA / CHA to provide 360 degree and current imagery of the site. There is potential that other sensors, not just cameras, can be fitted.
IED threat assessment
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