1.3.MINE ACTION IEDD GUIDING PHILOSOPHY
The following statements, as per IMAS 09.31 and listed in order of importance, make up the guiding philosophy used when undertaking MA IEDD operations: 1. Preservation of life; 2. Preservation of infrastructure and property; 3. Restoration of the situation to normality as quickly as possible commensurate with safety or the quality requirements for the task; 4. Gathering technical information to inform the national threat analysis and task level threat assessment. How can this guiding philosophy be applied to IEDD operations during an MA intervention?
SCENARIO EXPLANATION
A hospital contains a large IED with two completely independent means of initiation: a failed mechanical timer that is ‘stuck fast’, and a secondary anti-lift switch under the main charge. Each of these has its own power source, detonator and explosive chain. The hospital is being cleared in accordance with IMAS 09.13 for Building Clearance when this IED is identified. The MA IEDD operator conducts questioning of the deminer / searcher who discovered the IED to gather information, enabling them to establish a task-specific threat assessment. Information, however, is limited. The IEDD operator conducts the first approach, however the initial threat assessment did not account for the IED having two independent means of initiation. The IEDD operator therefore only took over a single disruptor. When the two independent means of initiation are identified, the assessment is as follows: “If the battery for the timer is targeted then the anti-lift switch will function; if the anti-lift switch is targeted then the timer may restart.” What should they do?
Options that the IEDD operator considers:
• Option 1. Conduct a manual action on the detonator lead from the anti-lift switch and then place the disruptor to target the battery connected to the timer. • Option 2. Place a semi-remote cutting option on the electrical lead from the anti-lift switch and then place the disruptor on the battery connected to the timer. • Option 3. Return to the control point (CP), replan and conduct a second approach with two disruptors instead of one.
This is a difficult scenario to consider, especially as the specific risks of both the failed timer and the anti- lift switch must be considered.
Option 1 discussion . If the IEDD operator conducts a manual action and the device functions, then fatalities will occur, and the hospital will be destroyed. This should never be considered as a viable option and runs contrary to the first and second guiding philosophies for MA IEDD. There is no recognised quality control in the construction of IEDs and the possibility of an error in judgement could result in a fatal accident. Option 2 discussion . This option lowers the risk to life as all positive actions can be conducted from the safety of the CP. However, these positive actions cannot be conducted simultaneously, increasing the possibility of an accidental detonation which would destroy the hospital. This would be contrary to the second guiding philosophy for IEDD.
IEDD in mine action – overview
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