3.1.3. PHASE 3 – EVALUATION AND PLANNING
EVALUATION
Evaluation is a continuation of the threat assessment conducted in Phase 2. While not all information may be known, the IEDD operator can make an assessment on the ‘most likely’ situation, but importantly they must make an assessment on the ‘worst case’ situation and the potential ‘best case’ situation as well. IMAS 09.31 for IEDD, Chapter 6.3 defines what the evaluation should include:
KEY CONSIDERATIONS
EXPLANATION
This is arguably the most important piece of information to be derived from the threat assessment. By correctly identifying the method of initiation the IEDD operator puts themselves in a strong position to safely dispose of the IED.
METHOD OF INITIATION (TIME, COMMAND, VICTIM OPERATED).
ׁ WARNING. Consideration should be given to the risk of more than one method of initiation being present.
By evaluating this correctly the IEDD operator knows the position of the components they want to target and, importantly, the location of items they want to avoid (e.g. the firing switch in the case of VOIEDs). It may also enable the IEDD operator to add a degree of safety by taking positive action from a safer location or a more accessible position (e.g. semi-remotely cutting a command wire far away from the main charge). This is particularly important with VOIEDs as different switches have different capabilities and means of detection. It ensures that the correct detection equipment and procedures are being used for the threat that is being faced. It is extremely important, in order to ensure public safety, that the IEDD operator has implemented sufficient cordon and evacuation for the size(s) of main charge(s) and additional hazards, such as fragmentation or projection. Where the exact size is not known the operator should assume the worst case. Removing all the initiators is part of the disposal process. Multiple initiators could mean the armed group is incorporating redundancy or that multiple switches are present on independent circuits. Improvised initiators can be extremely sensitive and may have plastic bodies which will not be detected with a metal detector. Having an idea of the type and colour of the electrical detonator leads will give an indication of the location of the detonator(s). This is extremely useful for buried IEDs or where a detonator is sealed inside the main charge. The power source is the primary target when trying to achieve neutralisation by disruption. This information indicates the size of metallic signature that the power source will present. This is extremely important when using detectors to locate the power source of a buried VOIED. Multiple independent power sources are likely to indicate that more than one switch is present. The power output may also indicate the armed group’s intent. For example, large power sources might be used if the armed group wants the IED to be viable for longer or the IED may require more power due to the length of a command wire.
THE LAYOUT AND POSITION OF COMPONENT PARTS.
TYPE(S) OF SWITCH(ES).
TYPE(S) OF MAIN CHARGE(S) INCLUDING NEQ AND FRAGMENTATION HAZARD.
NUMBER AND TYPE OF INITIATORS (DETONATORS) AND, IF POSSIBLE, THE TYPE AND COLOUR OF ELECTRICAL LEADS.
NUMBER, TYPE AND CONFIGURATION OF POWER SOURCES.
IEDD task conduct
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