A breakdown of the evidence and assessment linkage is as follows:
OPERATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT
EVIDENCE
ASSESSMENT
Due to the parties of an armed conflict’s (in context) considerate nature towards the community of the area and the evidence that suggests the local community were instructed to not use the route, creating inconclusive evidence of a negative environment. The armed group would have expected opposing forces as the route channelled vehicles and people. The conditions allow good placement of IEDs due to the relatively soft ground, a Big 5 indicator . Areas of disturbance can be seen on the track with what seems to be linear regularity in a disturbance running away to the verge (assessed as remote power source).
VOIED contamination on the main route running through the village. Most likely to be VOIEDs (pressure) with the power source offset 4–5 m from the switch to hamper detection.
This lends itself to the use of VOIEDs, likely with a remote power source to enable arming and disarming and making it more difficult to detect by reducing the IED’s metal content on the route.
This crater is commensurate with a 10–20 kg subsurface HME main charge. During the conflict, the armed group in this area rarely used command-initiated IEDs and the ground in question does not lend itself to such a type of attack due to limited lines of sight.
The main charge most likely contains approximately 15–20 kg of HME, located in the centre of the route and offset 1 m from the pressure plate switch.
A crater, or disturbance from one of the explosions is around 3 m in diameter and 0.5 m deep. It is located in the middle of the route.
Scenario examples
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