CAPABILITY
The NSAG had access to the full spectrum of IEDs, from armoured VBIEDs to time, command and VO devices. They had been known to use a combination of switches, either as safe-to-arm, or as multiple firing switches for the same IED. They would carefully match the main charge to the target in order to achieve the best effect.
OPPORTUNITY
The NSAG needed to maintain ease of access into and out of the site but at the same time needed an effective explosive obstacle both day and night. The state armed group made use of ECM to mitigate RCIEDs and there are no aiming markers or suitable firing points to aid an effective command wire attack.
There are, however, lines of sight down the route from the sewage works that would have enabled VOIEDs to be armed by RC prior to any ECM being effective at jamming signals.
Site of explosion
Image 78. Site of the explosion between the speed bumps
THREAT SUMMARY
It is likely that the IED that caused the explosion was an RC-armed VOIED (sensor). It is probable that the main charge was an EFP located off route in an elevated position on the bund adjacent to the route. It is probable that the sensor was offset from the main charge. The sensor is probably a passive infrared, although other sensors cannot be discounted.
It is probable that additional RC-armed VOIEDs (sensors) are located on the other approach route and it is possible that further devices are located on the same route where the explosion occurred.
Technical IED capabilities
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