IED Clearance Good Practice Guide

1.2.GENERAL SEARCH PRINCIPLES The following eight principles are specified in IMAS 09.13 Building Clearance but can be applied to other types of space being searched for IEDs. The principles are explained in relation to IED contamination in an operational context.

PRINCIPLE 1 An EO threat assessment based on all available evidence gained from survey and technical interventions should be developed and continually reviewed.

Threat assessment is the primary means by which to make evidence-informed decisions during MA operations involving IEDs. All available information sources should be investigated throughout the entire course of an operation; from the initial survey to the final handover. If this does not happen, safety may be compromised and opportunities to enhance efficiency may be lost.

ׁ HINT. The trigger for reviewing a threat assessment is a change in the information that was used to make the previous threat summary.

For example, at the commencement of operations it may not be possible to discount the threat of tripwires. As operations progress, new information may emerge that can be analysed and used as evidence to discount this threat, enabling the search procedures to be modified and efficiency increased. This modification could change the search procedure by removing the use of a tripwire feeler as a tool, to enhance visual detection of a tripwire.

Image 1. Conducting ‘tripwire feeling’ in a complex environment to enhance visible detection. This procedure should be specified in the clearance plan

Introduction

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